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The somewhat uncritical appeal to 'Arrow Impossibilities' in rejecting 
any notion of aggregate criterion functions to provide more structure to 
problems in the optimal formulation of economic policy seems, almost always, 
due to confusing Arrow's aims with the general problem of preference in 
relation to value theory in general, and to its three principal branches —  
aesthetics, economics and ethics. Recent work by Sen (1973) , Harsanyi 
(1977, esp. Ch.4), Johansen (1969) and others, indicates that serious 
attempts, at a theoretical level, are being made to delineate more clearly 
the precise domain of relevance of impossibility theorems in relation to 
concepts of pure preference (cf. von Wright, 1963). As Johansen very 
pungently noted:
"I think the existence question [of an aggregate objective function] 
is wrongly put. It exists if we have constructed it3 and the 
relevant question is whether we will find it useful and practicable 
to establish it". (Johansen, 1979, p.108: italics added).
Johansen was, perhaps, only restating more concisely the almost 
passionate appeals made by that great initiator and practitioner (and indeed 
Johansen's own teacher) of quantitative economic policy: Ragnar Prisch. In 
his Nobel Prize Lecture - recently reprinted in a special volume of the 
American Economic Association (cf. Frisch, 1981) - and even more emphati­
cally in his highly detailed last-published work1 (cf. Frisch, 1972)
Frisch made a strong plea for a 'Cooperation Between Politicians and
-
Econometricians on the Formalizatiqn of Political Preferences'. The 
theory of economic policy owes a great deal for its quantitative develop­
ments to the pioneering works of Frisch, Tinbergen, Theil and Bent Hansen
An earlier version of this paper was presented at a seminar in the 




























































































(cf. Tinbergen, 198 3, pp. 1(51-162) . However, in spite of early work by 
Frisch himself (Frisch, 1956; 1959; 1961) the delicate problem of 
formalizing the (aggregate) criterion (or preference) function tradi­
tionally employed in deriving optimal economic policy rules seems to have 
been bedevilled by the above-mentioned confusion with Arrow's important 
results. Frisch, in referring to objectives based on Arrow 'type1 
results to the use of an aggregate preference function 'which must under­
lie the very concept of an optimal economic policy', went on to observe 
(and here we choose to quote extensively so as to avoid misunderstandings 
about the precise nature of our own aims):
"It is said that there are many different systems of preferences.
It is impossible to choose between these systems. Therefore 
the concept of a preference function cannot be used in connection 
with national models. This is one of the biggest pitfalls in this 
discussion of this matter. Of course, there are differences of 
opinion. One social group may have one type of preference and 
another social group may have other preferences, and different 
persons may have different preferences, and even the same person 
may have different preferences at different points of time. All 
this is, of course, true. But the problem of settling differences 
of opinion is not a special problem of econometrics. It is a 
general problem of human behaviour and opinions. And there exists 
a machinery for settling such differences. This machinery is 
simply the political system of the country. This political 
system - whatever it may be - has been created for the very purpose 
of settling such differences. What we have to do as econometri­
cians is to apply this very system for the formalization of the 
preferences to go with our models. Thus the preference function 
as it appears in our models is an expression of the preferences of 
the decision-making authority, whatever that authority may be.
The preference function in the model must not be confused with a 
general 'Welfare function' in the sense of welfare theory".
(Frisch, 1972, pp.7-8: italics added, and cf. also, Frisch, 1961,




























































































Interpreting Frisch's strictures almost literally, we try, in this 
paper, to provide an iterative scheme to enable a policy maker and an 
econometrician (model builder) to cooperate in the formalization of 
political preferences in the sense of trying to quantitatively clarify 
what the political authorities really are aiming at.
Thus, in Section 2, a summary of Frisch's formulation of the 
problem is given. In Section 3, on the basis of our interpretation of 
Frisch's formulation, a formalized positive, constructive, solution in 
the form of an iterative scheme to encapsulate Frisch's 'interview 
technique' is offered. In Section 4 some technical remarks on computa­
tional considerations and convergence problems are discussed*.
In Sections 5 and 6 we discuss extensions of our method, 
again within the aims set forth by Frisch in the above two publications 
and, in particular, to the problems of the 'Optimal Price of a Bound' 
(Frisch, 1972; pp.14-17), i.e., shadow prices. Finally, in Section 7 
we discuss the complexity of the policy design process implied by the 




























































































2. Frisch on the "Cooperation Between Politicians and 
Econometricians on the Formalization of Political 
Preferences"
Leif Johansen's survey (Johansen, 1974) provides a 
comprehensive and highly readable account of Ragnar Frisch's contribu­
tions towards solving the problem of constructing political preference 
functions (cf. Frisch, 1956; p.45ff and Frisch, 1961; p.44), for 
so-called macroeconomic decision models (or for the purpose of 
macroeconomic programming). We need, therefore, to concentrate only 
on a summary of the essentials of Frisch's approach and refer the 
interested reader to Johansen's detailed article.
In a series of articles, stretching over a period of over forty 
years, Ragnar Frisch was concerned with the problem of constructing 
what he called political preference functions for use in deriving 
optimal macroeconomic policies. The econometrician's duty (cf. below, 
f.n.2), he maintained, was to make it possible for the political
3decision maker(s) to be aware of what the economy was able to do so
that they, in turn, can formulate their wishes regarding what it ought
to do - or should be made to do such that policies can be devised in
4an efficient way to achieve the latter desires. The policy maker was 
expected to fix certain bounds for the levels and rates of change of 
politically sensitive variables in addition to the coefficients of a 
preference function indicating relative desires between (those bounded 
variables themselves and any) other necessary additional variables^. 
Frisch very clearly pointed out that the policy maker's awareness of 
what was feasible determined, to a large extent, the nature and scope 
of the bounds (s)he would tend to consider, as well as the relative 
weights that were to be attached to relevant variables in the preference




























































































cian and the policy maker cooperate in such a way that an increasing 
'perceptibility of the variable from the preference view point' (Frisch 
1961, p.47) and a clearer indication of the nature of the bounds that 
roust be imposed will become possible. Together with an element of 
consistency on the part of the policy maker - with the dose of realism 
or pragmatism that this class of worthy persons seem naturally to possess 
(an 'overdose' some idealists would contend!) - this cooperation with the 
econometricians should, iteratively, lead to a set of bounds and weights 
(for the preference functions) such that a politically acceptable set of 
values for the variables of interest can be derived using an optimal set 
of economic policies. Put another way, the idea is that the economet­
rician, as a neutral expert, should be able to advise on the optimality 
of economic policies that can generate a politically acceptable set of 
trajectories such that the interlocking nature of desires, constraints 
and weights will be made very clear to the policy maker who, as a result 
of this, reveals, almost unwittingly, his desires and dreams whilst, 
hopefully, shedding some, at least, of his delusions.
The particular technique of such a cooperation between a policy 
maker and an econometrician was to be a consecutive series of carefully 
constructed interviews. Frisch, in the papers already cited above, 
investigated in great detail the efficient formulation of interview 
techniques. Basically there were three types of interview questions:
a) Questions such that alternatives would be ranked.
b) Questions of a dichotomic nature.
c) Distribution questions.
These three types of questions were related to the type of preference 
functions he was trying to construct. The first type of question was 




























































































the latter two were used, in combination, in his attempts to construct 
quadratic preference functions.
The sequence of questions, and hence the envisaged cooperation between 
econometricians and policy maker, itself was to take the following form:
a) In a preparatory phase, the econometrician, armed with a compre­
hensive model of the economy and 'making a systematic use of his 
general knowledge of the political atmosphere in the country, and 
in particular the political atmosphere, in the party in question 
to which a constructed preference function would apply' (Frisch 
1972• p.10), should form 'a tentative opinion' about the weights
to choose.
b) Using the above weights, and depending on the type of preference 
functions to be constructed (i.e., linear, quadratic, cubic, etc.) 
optimal values for relevant variables are generated and the policy 
maker is confronted with them, in terms of one of the above three 
types of questions.
c) The answers, which cannot be arbitrary given the carefully struc­
tured questions, will generally indicate the nature of changes 
needed 'in the formulation of the preference function in order to 
produce a solution that comes closer to what the politicians .... 
say they want' (Frisch, 1972; p.12).
d) The task of the econometrician, at this stage, is to translate 
these vague indications to concrete changes in the weights of the 
preference function, such that a new solution closer to what the




























































































e) Using these 'new' weights a new set of optimal solutions^ will be
- should be - generated by the econometrician (and his collaborators).
These new solutions, closer to what the policy makers say they wanted,
when next presented to them may elicit the following response:
"No, this was not really what we wanted .... we have to 
change these particular aspects of your solution" (Frisch 
1972, p.12).
f) Earlier steps are then repeated with the result (hopefully!) that:
"[it] .... leads to a discussion back and forth. In this 
way one will work step by step towards a preference formulation 
such that the politicians can say about the resulting solution:
'All right, this is what we should like to see'. Or perhaps 
the expert will have to end by saying politely: 'Your Excel­
lencies, I am sorry but you cannot, at the same time, have all 
these things on which you insist'. Their excellencies, being 
intelligent persons, will understand the philosophy of the 
preference questions .... and will .... acquiesce in a solution 
which is not quite what they like, but at least something better 
than other alternative lines of the development course which 
have emerged from the previous tentative formulations of the 
preference function". (Frisch, 1972; p.13: italics added.)
At this point, of course, the iteration ends. However, the following 
additional points, reflecting various observations made by Frisch at variou 
stages over four decades of grappling with this problem, must be noted.
(i) Though Frisch did not consider anything other than linear,
quadratic and cubic preference functions - and thus the interview 
questions were formulated with such functions in mind - he was 
aware of technical devices whereby more general functional forms 
could be reduced to the above simpler forms. In fact he worked 




























































































preference function. (But, cf. Frisch, 1972 ,Ch.7, pp.30-32.) 
However, in discussing the problem of 'the bounds' (or the 
constraints) he did note that, in some important cases, general 
nonlinearities in the preference function can be 'transferred' 
to inequality constraints of the model subject to which the 
macroeconomic programming problem is solved.
(ii) Though we have, above, summarized an iterative scheme for the 
construction of a policy maker's preference function, it must 
be noted that Frisch went beyond the case of a single decision 
maker. But the details were not worked out as in the case 
for a single policy maker (cf., however, Frisch, 1959, 1967 , 
and our own attempts, in this spirit, in Rustem and Velupillai , 
1979 , and Goodwin and Velupillai, 1982 ) .
(iii) The importance of specifying correctly the desired trajectories 
was stressed by Frisch in almost all the above-tcited articles. 
Ke did not assume that the policy maker would have, a priori, a 
'correct' view of the desired trajectories. During the course 
of the iterative process of interview, results, re-evaluations 
the policy maker was supposed to become clearer, not only about 
what he wanted, but also about the feasible set of the model. 
This, he maintained, should imply that the policy maker should 
force the model to work at capacity (cft also Kornai , 1975, 
esp. p.42C, ff.).
(iv) Frisch took great care to point out that the econometrician
should devise techniques such that the policy maker will only 
have to respond with respect to variables of direct relevance - 
the rest should be taken care of by the model at the disposal




























































































by Johansen's following clear observation:
"It may be necessary for the [econometrician ] to explain 
.... more carefully to the politician and perhaps advise 
him on those aspects of the [indirect variables, e.g.: ] 
'preference for investment' which are not a question about 
[direct variables, or] pure preferences but also a question 
about the likely effects of [indirect variables on direct 
ones, i.e.:] investment on future consumption possibilities. 
... [Thus, ] .... the [econometrician] should take great care 
to explain to the politician that he should not think of 
investment as a means of stimulating income by a multiplier 
effect: this effect should be taken care of by the model,
and not interefere with the specification of the preferences". 
(Johansen ,1974 , p.48: italics added.)
Naturally, it will be impossible to do full justice to the unique 
contributions made by Ragnar Frisch within the compass of a potted 
summary that we have attempted in this Section. However, the 
problem is important and so few seem to have been seriously interes­
ted in it (in spite of the almost indiscriminate use of optimal 
control and mathematical programming techniques at all levels of
planning and analysis) that, even at the risk of some distortion, it
7may be worthwhile .
The formalization as an iterative process of Frisch's 
'interview approach' towards constructing a preference function of a
g




























































































3. An Iterative Method to Formalize Frisch's Scheme
The problem we wish to formalize, then, is the case in which a policy
maker desires to optimize a certain set of target variables which are, in
general, functions of the remaining (e.g. decision) variables, subject to
9a set of constraints on all the variables . The policy maker's implicit 
preference function is assumed, in turn, to be a quadratic function of the 
target variables. The existence of nonlinear relationships between the 
target and other variables, also noted by Frisch ( c.f. (i) , Section 2) , 
enables one to consider more general nonlinearities (than the quadratic 
case in the preference function by replacing them with suitable relations 
in the constraint set. The essential point of Frisch's problem is'that 
the policy maker’s preference function is not known explicitly either to 
himself or the econometrician. It is to be elicited by means of a series 
of interactions between the policy maker and the econometrician - the 
latter equipped with the set of relations describing the feasible set of 
the economy and some intuition about the possible weights between the 
target variables. From this starting point an iterative sequence of 
optimization, reflection, re-evaluation between the policy maker and the 
econometrician should lead to a converging set of weights between the 
target variables as awareness develops of the nature of the economy's 
feasible set and the policy maker's (implicit) system of values.
Frisch's own positive solution - and other related approaches - rely 
heavily on some variant of the interview technique in that at each itera­
tion, starting from an arbitrary (but informed) set of weights, in the 
interaction a class of values for the target set of variables is optimally 
generated and presented to the policy maker. The latter is then asked to 
rank the alternative sets in terms of desirability. The next iteration, 




























































































in a similar fashion. This exercise is repeated until, hopefully, some 
such point as depicted in (f) in Section 2 is reached.
There are, however, some undesirable features in the above procedure 
and Frisch was well aware of them. This was why he devoted so much time 
to the obviously unenviable task of devising suitable questions. Quite 
apart from the difficult question of convergence, this procedure does not 
eliminate the need to ask the policy maker to rank alternatives in terms 
of desirability. It was precisely to avoid this, on the basis of his 
practical experience in India and Norway, that Frisch went to great pains 
in perfecting his interview techniques. Frisch repeatedly stressed the 
point that it was impossible, and indeed unfair, to expect policy makers 
to be explicit about desired rankings from a set of Pareto efficient 
alternatives.
Thus, in attempting to formalize the Frischian scheme we have paid 
particular attention to the problem of the convergnece of weights in a 
finite number of iterations and, more importantly, to avoid the need to 
force the policy maker to be explicit about ranking a set of Pareto 
efficient alternatives. Indeed, in our method, the policy maker is not 
confronted, at each iteration, with a set of Pareto efficient alternatives 
He is, in fact, presented with one optimally generated set of values for 
the target variables and asked only to indicate preferred directions for 
each one of them. These preferred directions are then translated into 
corrections of the weights.
Let, therefore, x e En be the vector of target variables and R- be 
the feasible set of x_. Let the elements of x be the desired values of 
the corresponding variables in x. The policy maker would ideally like 
to achieve x = x . Indeed, given the restriction R, a particular 




























































































values if the rest of the elements are allowed to assume any value required 
to attain these desired values. However, usually some elements of x^ 
imply a somewhat conflicting desire with respect to other elements of x^.
Thus, all the elements of x^ cannot be attained simultaneously and hence
d d dx̂  is infeasible, i.e., jc £ R. Clearly, when x £ R, all the x
values desired by the policy maker can be attained and thus the optimal
policy would have the obvious solution x = x^. This paper is therefore
obviously concerned with the problems arising when x.̂  £ R. In such
cases, the relative importance of each element of x_ attaining its desired
value has to be determined. This information can then be used to compute
the best feasible alternative on R to x^. In mathematical terms, this
problem can be summarized as
min{q (x) x £ r } c —  1 — (3.1)
where 10
, . A , d _ . d. .q (X) = h < x - X , Qc (x - x_ ) >





11and is a symmetric , positive semi-definite weighting matrix which
specifies the relative importance of each element of x attaining its
corresponding desired value. Clearly, by specifying a positive definite
Q , a measure of distance from x to x_ is defined (see (3.3)). The
iterative method of this paper is aimed at the tailoring of Q to meetc
the requirements of the policy maker regarding the target variables. The 
method is not concerned with a "best" set of weights independent of the 
desired value xd . A solution, optimally generated via (3.1), acceptable 
to the policy maker is the main aim. Once the initial optimal solution 




























































































in which the policy maker can specify his dissatisfaction with the various 
elements of the optimal solution and leaves it to the method to alter Qc 
to generate a more acceptable optimal solution. The method translates 
the policy maker's dissatisfaction with the initial optimal solution into 
a rank-one correction to Q^. It is proposed that an "optimal" weighting 
matrix will be obtained by repeated updating so that, at the end of the 
iterative procedure, the "final" optimal solution will be totally accep­
table to the decision maker.
When is positive definite and R is convex, the solution of
(3.1) has a simple geometric interpretation. As (3.1) minimizes the 
norm defined in (3.3), the solution is the projection of x^ on to R 
with respect to the norm (3.3) (see Luenberger, 1969; Rustem, 1981).
When R denotes a set of linear equality constraints, e.e.
R = { x _ £ E n | N T x = b }  (3.4)
where b_ is an (m x 1) constant vector and N is an (n x m) matrix 
whose columns are assumed (for simplicity) to be linearly independent, 
this projection, and hence the solution of (3.1) , is stated in the 
following Lemma.
Lemma 1
When Qc is positive definite and R is given by (3.4), the 
solution of (3.1) is
d T -i T dx = x - H N(N H N) 1 (N x - b ) — c —  c c —  — (3.5)
where





























































































and the Lagrange multipliers (or shadow prices) associated with (3.1) 
are given by
X = - ( NT H N)-1 (NT xd - b) .-c c —  — (3.7)
Proof
Writing the Lagrangian associated with (3.1)
Lc —) = 9C ~ < NT x - Id , A_ >
both (3.5) and (3.6) can be derived straightfordly from the following 
first order optimality conditions
(3.8)
Q (x - xd) N X = 0c -c —  -c — (3.9)
TN x - b -c — 0 .
□
(3.10)
In subsequent sections the positive definiteness of Q and thec
restrictive structure of (3.4) are relaxed. However, expressions 





























































































4. The Iterative Method for Determining the 
Weighting Matrix
Let S]c En denote the set of admissible values of x̂  from the
point of view of the decision maker. Given the desired value x_u and
the region R, the "nearness" of the solution of (3.1) to x is only-
affected by the weighting matrix Q . Q is initially assumed to bec c
positive definite and subsequently relaxed to be positive semi-definite.
In the latter case, the target values are allowed to be a subset of the
vector x_. In the former case, x and the targets are identical.
Different values of this matrix define different points on R as the
d dnearest point to x. . Thus, given x , the only way of producing a 
solution of (3.1) that also satisfies is to re-specify Q . It
should be noted that, in contrast to the algebraic equalities and 
inequalities describing R, the set is assumed to exist only in the 
mind of the rational decision maker. It is also assumed that
!) O R  / j) (4.1)
and that this intersection is convex. Clearly, this assumption is
satisfied for convex R and ft. Thus, problem (3.1) has to be solved
a number of times, by re-specifying , until a solution is found such
that x E (2 n r .-c
Let denote the current weighting matrix of (3.2). The solution
of (3.1) using this matrix will be called the "current" optimal solution
x . This solution is presented to the decision maker, who may decide
that x ?? since some of the elements of x are not quite what he -c -c
wants them to be. Consequently, an alternative solution of (3.1) has to 




























































































required to specify an x value which he would prefer instead of x .—  -c
This "preferred" value is denoted by x^ and obviously satisfies
X efl (4.2)-p
but not necessarily
x e R . (4.3)-P
Thus, x incorporates all the alterations to x such that x is-p ^  -c -p
preferred, by the decision maker, to x^. Given x^ and x^, the 
displacement, or correction vector is defined as
6 = x - x (4.4)-  -p -c
Given 6 , 0  is altered to obtain the new weighting matrix Q , —  c n
using the rank-one correction
Qn
Qc § f  Qc
Q + y — ------
< <5, q 5 >- c -
(4.5)
where y > 0 is a scalar chosen to reflect the amphasis to be given to 
the update. The new matrix is used in (3.1) to compute a "new"
optimal solution x^. The role of y in determining x^ and the 
desirable characteristics of x^, including the fact that it is an 
improvement on x^, are discussed in Sections 5 and 6. A single 
update of the form (4.5) does not necessarily yield a new optimal solu­
tion such at x^ £ ft. Thus, (4.5) has to be utilized iteratively until 
x^ £ ft. This iterative procedure, which is our attempt to formalize 




























































































Step O : Given the desired value and the feasible region R,
assume some initial symmetric, positive semi-definite weighting matrix 
Qc (corresponding to (a) in Section 2).
Step 1 : Using Q^, solve (3.1) to obtain (corresponding to (b)
in Section 2).
Step 2 : [This step describes the interaction between the policy maker
and the method. ] If, according to the policy maker x^ £ fi, stop.
Otherwise ask the policy maker to specify the changes, 6, required in 
the current optimal solution x^ to make it acceptable. The preferred 
value x^ is thus specified as
x = x + 6 .-p -c -
Alternatively, the policy maker might choose to specify x^ directly 
(corresponding to (c) in Section 2).
Step 3 : Given and 6_, choose a y S 0 and compute using
(4.5) (corresponding to (c) in Section 2).
Step 4 : Set and to Step 1 (corresponds to (f) in Section 2).
The choice of y is bounded from above and this bound is discussed
in Section 5. Also, the denominator of (4.5) has to be protected from
becoming zero. This can be accomplished with small changes to 6 within
limits acceptable to the policy maker. Provided this is done, Q remainsn





























































































5. Properties of the Method: Linear Equality Constraints
In this section the specific case arising when R is given by (3.4) 
is discussed. Convex and general nonlinear constraints are considerfed in 
Section 6. However, it should be noted that the basic results for linear 
equality constraints in this section are also essential for the discussion 
in Section 6. The properties of the iterative procedure of the previous 
section can best be analyzed by inspecting the effect of updating on
the optimal solution of (3.1). The next two theorems characterize the 
effect of (4.5) as a corresponding update on the current optimal solution 
x^ and its corresponding shadow price X ^.
Theorem 1
Let be positive definite and the feasible region R be given by
(3.4) . Then for any 6_ * 0. and y > 0, given by (4.5) is positive
definite and the new optimal solution obtained by using instead of
in (3.1) is given by
x = x + a P 6 (5.1)-n -c —
where
P = I-H N(NT H N)_1NT (5.2)c c
dy < 6 , Q (x - x ) >—  c -c -a ----------------------------------- (5.3)
< 6_, Qc 6_> + y<Qc _5 , P Hc (Qc 6) >
The corresponding shadow price vector at x^ is given by
X = X - a(NT H N)-1 NT 6 . (5.4)-n -c c —




























































































The fact that is positive definite if is positive definite
follows trivially from (4.5). Expressions (5.1) and (3.2) can be derived, 
as discussed in Rustem, Velupillai, Westcott (1978, Lemmas 1 and 2), by 
using (4.5) instead of Qc in (3.5) and by applying the Sherman-Morrison 
formula (see, e.g. Householder, 1964). Alternatively, since from (3.5) 
and (3.7) it follows that
dx = x + H N X , (5.5)-n - n -n
(5.1) and (5.2) can be derived from the derivation of X g i v e n  below. 
However, this will not be discussed any further. To derive the update
(5.4), consider
Xn
T -i T d(N H N) 1 (N x - b) n —  — (5.6)
N
Q 6 6T Q~ . c ---c
2C + U --- T ----(6TQc 6)
-i
N T d(N x - b)
-l
T Ty N 6 6 N
N H N - c (1 + y) <6, Qc §_>
T d(N x - b )
! . y(n t h n ) 1 nt6 6t n (n t h n )-1
= - (NTH N)_1(NTxd - b ) ------- 2 -------£-------  ---
(y+l)<5,Q 5 > - y <6,n (n t h N) xn 6 > —  c —  —  c —
,„T d (N x b )
y < 6, n (nTh n) 1 (NTxd -b) >—  Q —  - rn _ I m= X " -------------------------------- (N H N) N 6_ .





























































































Expressions (3.7) and (3.9) may be used to simplify (5.7) since
< 6 , N(NT H N) _1 (NT x d - b ) > = < 5 , N A > —  c —  —  —  -c
= < 6 , Q  (x - x ) > —  c -c (5.8)
and (5.7) with (5.8) yields the required result (5.4) with a given by 
(5.3). Expression (5.7) can also be used along with (5.5) to derive
(5.1). Finally, it can be seen from (5.3) by inspection, that if 
inequality
< 6 , Q (x - xd) > < 0 (5.9)—  c -c -
is satisfied, then a >: 0, since P is symmetric positive semi-
definite .
□
The matrix (5.2) is a well-known projection operator which 
projects vectors in En on to the subspace
R = {x £ En I NT x = 0 } (5.10)
o  —  —  —
(see, e.g. Goldfarb, 1969; Rustem, 1981). Thus, the correction term 
a P 6_ in (5.1) is along the projection of a 5 on to R^. Following 
the discussion in Section 3, this implies that x^ is as "near" to the 
preferred solution x^ as allowed by the feasible region R. The 
magnitude of the stepsize a can be controlled using ]i. The inequality 
(5.9) may be interpreted as a "rationality condition" on the choice of 
6_. The reason for this lies in the form of (5.1). When (5.9) holds, 
then a 5 0 and thus the modification a P 6 to the current optimal



























































































alternative to _ó, in the sense of the norm (3.3), allowed by the feasible 
region when 5 is infeasible and lies outside R. Also, since 6 is
given by (4.4) , it needs to be a descent direction for q^tx) at x • 
Thus, the information that x^ is actually preferred to xc is incorpo-
rated in V Ï(x) Using (4.5) with (5.9) establishes this result
< 6, V q (x ) > = < ô, Q (x -x ) > —  n -c —  n -c -
= < <5, Qc + y
Q Ô <S Q c --- c
<0, Qc 8_ > }
(x - x  ) > -c -
= (1 + y) < 6, Q (x - xd) >—  c - c -
= (1 + y) < ô , V q (x ) > (5.—  c -c
Thus, _5 is a descent direction for q^(x ) if it is a descent direction
for q (x ) and condition (5.9) ensures the latter, c -c
The properties of the method, discussed in the next
section, are dependent on the form of (5.1) which is used to show that for
a bounded, using y to control its size, the distance between x and-n
x is less than the distance between x and x (see Lemma 5 below) .-p -c -p
The basic limitation of Theorem 1 is that Q , and hence Q , arec n
assumed to be strictly positive definite. As discussed in Section 1,
this is a rather restricted view of policy decisions since the policy maker
need not attach an objective to every element of x: some elements may
have an objective, whereas others may be free variables in the region R._
It is worth noting that when is positive semi-definite, the update




























































































As mentioned in Section 4, this inequality can be maintained with small 
changes in 6, within limits acceptable to the policy maker. Also, if 
the vector 6 is always specified to express corrections only in those 
variables which have objectives (i.e. those for which the submatrix Q 
is positive definite) , then it can be shown that 6_ lies in the range 
of and thereby satisfies < 6_, Qc 6_ > > 0 .  The following result
establishes analogous expressions to (5.1)-(5.4) when is positive
semi-definite in general but its projection on the intersection of the 
constraints is positive definite.
Theorem 2
Let Qc be positive semi-definite, the feasible region be given by
(3.4) and let Z denote an n x (n-m) matrix with linearly independent
columns orthogonal to the n x m matrix of linearly independent constraint
Tnormals N in (3.4) with Z Qc z positive definite. Then for any
6_, < 6_, Qc 6_ > > 0 ,  and y > 0, given by (4.5) is positive semi-
definite and the new optimal solution is given by
x = x + a p Q 6 -n -c z z c —
where
P = Z(ZT Q Z)-1 ZT z c
a z
y < 6, Q (x —  c -c )>
<6, Q 6 > +y <Q 5,—  c —  c — z c 6 >
The corresponding shadow price vector at x^ is given by
X-n X -  a (nTn ) -1-c
































































































Furthermore, a z ^ 0 for
< 6, Q (x - x ) > S 0. —  c -c - (5.16)
Proof
The positive semi-definiteness of follows directly from (4.5)
for positive semi-definite Qc - To establish (5.12), consider the opti­
mality condition (3.9) with Q^, given by (4.5), replacing
Q + y c
Q 6 5 Qc - - c
< 6, q 6 >- c -
(x  -  x  + x  -  x  ) - N A = 0-n -c -c - -n (5.17)
Any vector v satisfying 
form v = Zw_ where w is 
Gill and Murray, 1978). ■ 
and thus
Rq given by (5.10) can be written in the
Tan (n - m) vector, since Z N = 0 (see, e.g.
As. both x and x satisfy R, x - x  £ R  -n -c ~n -c o
x - x = Z w -n -c — (5.18)
for some w. Using (5.18) and pre-multiplying (5.17) by Z yields
q c + y
Q 5 6 Qc - - ^c
< 6, Q 6 > - c —
(Z w + xc - x ) = 0
Z w = - Z q + yc
Q 5 ST q c —  ^c
< 6, Q 6 >1 —  >  -
-1
Tz Z Q + y
Q 6 ST q c - - c
< 8, q 6 >)
(x - X ) . -c (5.19)
Expression (3.9) can be used to establish the equality




























































































x, - x = Z w = - Z -h -c — ec + y
Q S ST Q*~c — — *c
< 6 ,  Q S > — c —
-1
f Q ÔÔT Q 
y — ------—
L < i ' Q c A >
(x -xd) 
- c  -
and the application of the Sherman-Morrison formula yields
x, = x - Z -h -c
TZ Q Z c
-i y(zTQcZ)-1 ztqcò 6t qcz (ztqcZ) 1
<6 ,q c6 > + y < QcS, Pz Qc§ >
f Q ô òTq c—  c y -------
<6,Q S>- r-
(x - x d) -c
from which, after some rearranging, the required result (5.12) follows.
An alternative expression to (3.7) for X is given by the leas,t-c
squares solution of using (3.9)
T —i T dX = (N N) N Q (x - x ) . -c c -c (5.20)
For Q , this becomes n
X =-n (ntn ) 1 nt Qc + y
Q <5 <5T Q ^c —  c
<6, Q 6>- c -
(x, - x + x - x -h -c -c
which can be simplified using (3.9) and (5.12) to yield
fT —1 TX = X + (N N) N -n -c V ^ h - ï c *  +U'
Q 6 ÔT Q
— ----- — (x - X +x -x ). jf _ s . -h -c -c < o , Q 6 > j- c -
T -1 TX + (N N) N O  -c C
3<Q 6,P Q 6> <6,Q (x -xd)>
a p 6 + a y Q 6  -------------- + y Q 6--------------Z Z -  Z C - _ p _ P ̂  c-< ô , Q 6 > - c - < 6 , Q Ô > - c -
After some rearrangement involving (5.14), this can be expressed as (5.15)
Finally, the fact that a S 0 when (5.16) is satisfied follows from thez




























































































Although Theorem 2 establishes a more general result, the projection
aspect of the method is equivalently characterised both in Theorem 1 and 
in Theorem 2 when is positive definite. The correspondence between
and A^ computed using the expressions derived in either of these 
Theorems is discussed in Lemma 2 below. When analysing the method further, 
the positive semi-definite case will be reduced to a positive definite 
problem of reduced dimension, assuming that the feasible region R bounds 
qc (x) from below, by considering an optimization problem in which those 
variables in q^(x) with zero weighting have been substituted out using 
some of the constraints in (3.1). If qc (x) is bounded below on R, 
then the weighting matrix resulting from such a substitution is positive
4
definite. This approach is adopted in more general terms in Theorem 2
Twhere the positive definiteness of Z Z is required instead of the
Tpositive definiteness of Q^. The matrix Z Z can be regarded as 
the projection of Qc on to the constraints. There are a number of 
ways of defining the matrix Z (see Gill and Murray, 1974). However, 
the most suitable is the one arising from the orthogonal decomposition 
of N 3 and this is discussed in detail by Gill and Murray (1978) who 
also study the updating of Z in the presence of linear inequality 
constraints.
Lemma 2
When is positive definite, x^ and A^ computed in Theorems
1 and 2 are identical. Hence
p<5_ = pz
a = az
(NTxd-b) = (n t n )-1 TN QC (x-c

































































































To establish that x^ computed using (5.1) and (5.12) are equivalent,
(5.21) and (5.22) must be shown to hold. Since P6 £R , we have- o
p<5_ = z w
Tfor some (n - m) vector u). Pre-multiplying by Z yields
zT q p 6 = zt q (t - h n (n t h n )-1nT )6 = zT o Z 0)c —  c —  c c —  *"c —
T Tz o 6  = z q z o) c —  c —
Tsince Z N = 0. Thus (5.1) and (5.12) are equivalent. It follows 
immediately that (5.3) and (5.14) are also equivalent and hence (5.22*) 
holds.
To show that (5.23) holds, consider the optimality condition (3.9). 
The left hand side of (5.23) may be expressed as
T —v T d T —i T d- (N H N) 1 (N x -b) = (N H N) 1 Nx (x - x ) c ~ c -c
= (NT H N) ~1 NT H NX c c ~c
= X-c
where X^ satisfies (3.9) for N full column rank. The right hand 
side of (5.23) can be expressed as
T  — i T  d T  —i T(N N) 1 N G(x - x ) = (N N) 1 N N X 
- c  -  - C
= X
- c
Thus (5.23) is satisfied. Finally, using (5.21) the required result is 
established for (5.24)
(n t n ) 1 NT Qc (i - p z q c )6_ = (n t n )_1 nT Qc Hc n (n t h n )_ i n t 6_





























































































6. Properties of the Method: General Convex and
Nonlinear constraints
A desirable local property of the method is that every time Q
is updated and a new optimal solution is computed, the policy maker is
more satisfied with the new optimal solution, x , than he was with the-n
current optimal solution, x^. The following two Theorems establish 
such results for the linear equality constrained case. These will then 
be extended to general convex and also nonlinear constraints.
Theorem 3
For 0 < a < 2 in (5.1), the inequality
II X - X || < || X - X ||" -n -p Q 11 -c ~p Q c c
(6 .1)
holds. Furthermore, for 0 < a < 2, (6.1) is a strict inequality.
Proof
Consider (5.1) with a = 1
x, = x + P 6 -1 -c (6 .2)
Hence i T, Xj - x q is the projection of <5 on to {x | N x =0} , or x^ i<
the projection of x on to R given by (3.4). The inequalityP
< x - x., Q (x - x.) > < 0  (6.3)-p -1 c -c -1
follows from the projection property of x^ (see, e.g. Luenberger, 1969, 
p .69; Rustem, 1981; Lemma 4.2). Defining x(a) as




























































































for 0 S a ^ 2 and using (6.3) we have
U(a) - xp ||Q 11 x - x + a(x. - x ) -c -p -1 -pP Q„
||x - X-C -p Q„
+ 2a < x - x, + x, - x , Q (x, - x ) > -c -1 -1 -p c -1 -c
+ a < x - x , Q (x - x ) -1 -C c -1 -c
X - X-c -p "£)
from which the result follows with x = x(a). Furthermore, it should-n
4
be noted that for 0 < a < 2 (6.2) becomes a strict inequality.
□
Lemma 3
For x^ given by (6.3), the inequality
< x - x , Q (x - x ) > > 0 (6.5)-p -1 n -1 -c
holds.
Proof
Using the update formula (4.5) in (6.8) we have





























































































< x  - x , Q (x - x ) >  < x. - x , Q (x - x )  -p -1 c -p -c_____ -1 -c c -p -c
< x  -x  , Q ( x  - x )  >-p -c c -p -c
>
= < X-p *1' Q (x. c -1 X ) >-c
+ V
X
ZE. " V Q (x - x c -p -1 *1 - X )-c - X-c Q (x -x. c -p -1 +?1 - X )-c
< X-p x , Q (x -c c -p x ) > -c
> 0
where the last inequality follows from the projection property.
□ *
Theorem 4
For 0 < a < 2 in (5.2) the inequality
x-P X-c X-p (6 .6)
holds. Furthermore, for 0 < a < 2 ,  (6.6) is a strict inequality.
Proof
Let x(a) be defined by (6.4). For 0 < a < 2 and using (6.5) 
we have
X - X - a(x. - x )-p -c -1 -c
| 2X - X-p -c 2n
2a < X - x, + x, --p -1 -1 x , Q (x -c n -1 x )> -c





























































































which establishes the required result with x = x(a).
" n  ‘  □
The difficulty in establishing similar results in the case of general 
convex constraints arises from the fact that there may not be a point between 
and x^, along x^ - x^, which can be expressed as the projection of 
x^ onto r , with respect to the weighting Q^, and hence solves the 
problem.
min{ 1j < x - x d , Qn ( x - x d) > | x £ R }  (6.7)
with some y > 0 defining via (4.5) and with convex R. The importance
of this becomes clear when the above linear equality constrained case is
considered. If, for given y, x is such that a > 2 in (5.2) , in the-n
linear equality case, reducing y clearly reduces a given by (5.3) and for
every value of y, x^ can be expressed in terms of (5.1) . Hence, if a > 2,
y can be reduced to define an x for which the bound 0 < a < 2 is satis--n
fied.
The main concept necessary for extending the results of Theorems 3 and 4
to general convex R is the line passing through x^ and x^. By considering
the projection of x on this line, it is shown in Theorem 5 below that (6.1)-P
and (6.6) hold for x close enough to x . It is also shown that if this is-n -c
not the case, reducing y brings x^ close to x^ so that for small enough y
(6.1) and (6.6) hold.




























































































For y > 0 in (4.5) and for x and-c
of (3.1) and (6.7) respectively, with convex
x^ given by the solutions 
R, the inequality
< x -P X ,-c Q (x c -n x ) > > 0-c





< x - x , Q (x — x ) > < 0  (6.9)-n -c n -n -
follows from the optimality of x^ for (6.7). Using (4.5) we have
0 > < x-n x , -c Q (x - x ) n -n < x -n x , -c Q (x c -n xd) > +
+ y
<6, Q 6 >- c-
< X-n x ,  Q 6 > < 5, -c c - - Q c (X-n >
= < x -n x , Q (x -c c -n x + x -c -c x ) >
< 6, Q 6 > - c-
[ < x - x , Q (x - x )  -n -c c -p -c
+ < x - -c
d x , Q (x *c -p X ) > < X-c -p x , Q (x -c c -n x ) > ]. -c (6 .10)
Since




























































































follows from the optimality of for (3.1) and
< x - x , Q (x - x ) > < 0 -p -c c -c
follows by hypothesis, inequality (6.10) can only be satisfied if (6.8) 
holds.
□
It should be noted that condition (5.9) also plays an important 
role in establishing (6.8).
Lemma 5
If the conditions of Lemma 4 hold, then y 0 implies that
*■ 0. Furthermore, for a fixed value of a > 0 , there exists a 
y > 0 that satisfies (5.3) and (5.4)
x - x -c -n
Proof
Using (4.5) with inequality (6.9) yields
0 < < x - x , Q ( x  - x ) > +-c -n c -n --------------  < x  ' 2 6 > <<5, Q (x - x  ) >. (6.12)< 6, Q 6 > c - n -- R e ­
using (6.8) and (6.9) it can be concluded from (6.12) that for y > 0,
< 6 , Q ( x - x ) > < 0. Thusc -n
< x  - x , q S > < S , Q ( x - x ) > > 0 -c -n c - - c -n - (6.13)
and moreover we have
< x - x , Q (x - xd) > < 0.-c -n c -n (6.14)
As y 0, the second term in (6.12) also approaches to zero implying, through
dinequalities (6.12) and (6.14) , that <x - x , Q (x - x )> -*■ 0. Since—c —n c —■n —




























































































<x - x , O (x - x )> = 0 due to orthogonality implies that x solves—c —n ~c —n —  —n
(3.1) and hence x = x . Finally, consider a given by (5.3) or (5.4). Due to—n —c
the equivalence of both expressions (see Lemma 2), only £5.3) is considered.
Given a, y = -a < 6_, Qc 6_ > / ( a< 6_, Q P 6> + < 6_, Q ^ x ^  - x_ ) >) . Thus, 
we only have to show that the denominator of this expression is negative. Using
(5.1) , the denominator can be written as <6, Q (x - x + x - x^)> = <6,Q (x - xd) ><0—  c —n —c —c —  —  c —n —
It also follows from (6.12) - (6.14) that for a strict inequality in (5.9) the 
above inequality is strict. Hence the denominator of the expression for y is 
strictly negative. Thus, for a fixed a > 0 the required result follows.
□
Lemma 5 implies that the scalar y can be used by the policy maker to
control the size of the norm I x -x ||. This result is utilised in Theorem 5.c —n"
Theorem 5
Let the conditions of Lemma 4 be satisified and consider the line
passing through x and x . Let x, be the projection of x on to-c -n -1 r -p
this line. Thus
x. = x + P 6 
- 1  - c
where P is the operator projecting, under the norm || • | , vectors
^c
in E on to this line. Then for x(a) given by
x(a) ^ x + a(x. - x ) and 0 < a < 2 
- c  -1  - c
Also
||x(a) - x-p llQ sc
x - X" -c -p Qc
(6.15)
|| x (a) - X IL * I X - X || (6.16)-p Qn -c -p "Qn



























































































with x > 0, which implies that both x. - x and x - x lie in-1 -c -n -c
the same direction. Furthermore, if
x X - (x I x = x +a(x, - x ) , ae [ 0, 2] } then there exists a 
y > 0, small enough, so that the resulting solution of (6.7) satisfies 
X and thereby (6.15) and (6.16) with x^ = x (a) .
□
Proof
Inequalities (6.15) and (6.16) are established in exactly the same
way as in Theorems 3 and 4, with the feasible region R replaced by the
line passing through x and x .-c -n
To show that T > 0 in (6.17), consider (6.8) which yields
0 S < x -P x-c / Q (x c -n X ) > = T < X-c -p X-c Q c X ) >.-c (6.18)
Since the inequality
< x -P *1 + *1 X , -c V x i x ) > £ 0 c
follows from (6.3), in order to preserve the non-negativity of (6.18) , 
the condition T > 0 must be satisfied. Thus, if x can be expressed 
as
x = x(a) = x + a(x. - x ) (6.18)-n - -c -1 -c
for some a E [ 0,2 ] then (6.15) and (6.6) hold. However, if x is-n
further away from so that a > 2, then y can be reduced. According
to Lemma 5, y -*• 0 implies II x - x II 0. In view of (6.18) ," -n -c "






























































































The extension of these results to general nonlinear constraints is 
possible since reducing y brings closer to Q , independently of
Lemmas 4 and 5. Thus, there exists a y > 0 for which inequalities
(6.9) and (6.11) are satisfied, and thence the results of Theorem 5 hold 
for general nonlinear constraints.
The above results are particularly helpful if x^ is at a vertex of 
linear constraints. If such vertices can be excluded, the following 
Theorem provides an alternative characterisation of the results of Theorem 
5 in the presence of general nonlinear constraints.
Theorem 6
There exist scalars y > 0  (y > 0 with vertices excluded) and 6 (y) > 0
(5(y) > 0 excluding vertices) such that || x^ - x || 5 6 (y) and all
inequality constraints satisfied as equalities (i.e. active) at x are-c
the same constraints as those satisfied as equalities at x^. Using
the mean value theorem, these active constraints may be expressed as
Tg(x ) - g(x ) = 0 = N (x , x ) (x - x ) where g is the vector of- -c - -n —  -c -n -c -n -
m active constraints and a
N(x , x ) A [ V g  ( x - t ( x  - x )),..., Vg (x - t (x - x))] -c -n - 1 -c 1 -n -c m -c m -n -c
with t,, ..., t £ (0,1). The line connecting x and x clearly 1 m -c -na
satisfies the above linear equality and thus, for small y, the results 
of Theorem 5 are valid for general nonlinear inequality constraints.
Proof
The linear equalities for g(x) are obtained by a simple application 
of the mean value theorem (see Ortega and Rheinboldt, 1970; Theorem 




























































































x are the same as those active at x consider the first order -c -n
optimality conditions for (3.1) and (6.7) when R is given by
{ x £ En | g (x) S 0 } .
with g as the vector of nonlinear inequality constraints. For (3.1) 
these conditions are
Q (x - x ) c -c
g (x ) < 0, - -c -
+ N X = 0c -c
< g (x ) , X > = 0,- -c -c X > 0 -c
where N is the matrix of constraint normals evaluated at x and c -c
for (6.7) we have
Q 6 ô Q * c  -  -  * cQ + h ---------C rT r0 Q 0 -  c -
(x  -  x ) + N X = 0-n n -n
g (x ) < 0, < g(x ), X > = 0, X >2 -n - - -n -n -n
Thus, as y -+■ 0, x^ x^ and with strict complementarity holding
at both x and x , the active constraints at x predict the -c -n -c
active constraints at x and vice versa for some y > 0, since-n
X1 > 0 ^ X 1 > 0 for the active constraint i as x -> x . n c -n -c
Having constructed the intersection of hyperplanes which charac­
terise the active constraints between x and x and in which the-n -c






























































































7. Khatchian1s Ellipsoid Algorithm and the
Complexity of the Policy Design Process
In this section we discuss briefly the termination property of a 
slightly modified and less intuitive version of the policy design process 
outlined in previous sections. In particular, we show that the modified 
policy design process terminates after a finite number of iterations if 
the econometric model and the inequality constraints bounding the region 
are assumed to be linear. The region and the inequality constr­
aints bounding it are still assumed to exist only in the mind of the 
policy maker. The consideration of the convergence of policy design 
processes under such circumstances may, in reality, be a contradiction in 
itself. Indeed, as discussed below, the convergence of the method 
ultimately depends on the policy designer and he/she may arbitrarily 
extend or truncate this process. Nevertheless, the "condition" under 
which the method converges, does provide an insight to the method from 
a different vantage point and indicates the reason why the policy 
- designer might extend or truncate the process. This is done by estab­
lishing an equivalence of the algorithms in Section 4 with Khatchian's 
(1979, 1980) ellipsoid algorithm for linear programming. The latter 
algorithm has been shown to terminate in polynomial time (i.e. the 
number of iterations required to arrive at a solution - or to establish 
the absence of one - is bounded by a polynomial in the original data of 
the problem (Khatchian, 1979, 1980; Kozlov, Tarasov and Khatchian, 1980;
Aspvall and Stone, 1979). This result is summarised in Theorem 7 below.
In order to introduce the ellipsoid algorithm, consider first the problem of




























































































< h , x > ^ g. 
- 1  -  î
i  — 1r « .  « ,  p (7.1)
where h e E , p > 2, n £ 2. Khatchian's algorithm, summarised below, 
finds such a point, or establishes its nonexistence, in a finite number 
of iterations. Let L be the length of the binary encoding of the 
input data h^, g^, i = 1, ..., p, i.e. the number of 0's and l's 
needed to write these coefficients in binary form:
n,p P
L = I log2 (|hi 1+1) + I log2 (|g 1+1) + log2 np + 2. (7.2)
i/j=l j=l
where h__ is the j th element of vector h^. Khatchian's algorithm 
assumes that coefficients h , g_. are integers. This can trivially 
be achieved, in general, by suitably scaling each inequality. The 
algorithm discussed below can also be used directly for non-integer 
h^j, gj. In this case, the slight change in the properties of the 
algorithm are discussed in Goldfarb and Todd (1982).
Khatchian's Algorithm
2lStep 1 : (Initialisation) Set x = 1 ,  H = 2  I, k = 0---*---- -o o
Step 2 : If xk satisfies
-L< h , x > < g + 2 tfi = 1, ...p-l (7.3)
then terminate the algorithm with x^ as a feasible
2solution. If k <  4(n + l) L, then go to Step 3. 





























































































Step 3 : Select any inequality for which
< h., x, > £ g. + 2 L -i - k i (7 .4)
and set
-k+1 -k
H, h. k -l
(n + 1) < h . , H, h . >-l k -l
and
(7.5)
V i  * 1 —  c \n - 1
H h . h . H, k -i-i k
n + 1 <h. , H h . > -l k -l
(7.6)
Set k = k + 1 and go to Step 2.
It can easily be shown that is symmetric positive definite
if H has these properties (see Aspvall and Stone, 1979; Lemma 3).K
Thus, there is no danger of the denominator of the above expressions to 
vanish, provided h^ ^ 0. The algorithm above actually finds a
feasible solution for the system of inequalities (7.3). However, the 
following Lemma ensures that this is compatible with the requirement of
the system (7.1).
Lemma 6 (Aspvall and Stone, 1979; Lemma 6)
The system of inequalities (7.1) has a solution if, and only if, 
the system of strict inequalities (7.3) has a solution.
□
The following theorem implies that the above algorithm returns a 





























































































Theorem 7 (Aspvall and Stone, 1979; Theorem 1)
The above algorithm returns a feasible solution if and only if
(5.1) is satisfiable.
□
Consider now the problem of finding the solution to the system of 
inequalities (7.1) in the presence of linear equalities
NT x = b . (7.7)
In this case, given a starting point x , the initial solution estimate 
is defined by
x = x - H, N(NT H, N)'1 (NT x -b)- o - o  k k -o -
TIt can be verified that N x = b. In order that-o
Tall x generated by the algorithms satisfy N x = b, we have to
“ X X
replace (5.5) by
x, . = x, -k+ 1 -k
Pk Hk *i
n + 1 <h. , H h . > -l k -r
(7.8)
where P = I - H  N(NT H N) 1 NT , similar to (5.2) , or, with H, = Q,1 ,
K X X K K
p. = Z(ZT Q z)-1 Z T Q , similar to (5.12) — (5.13) 13. It can also be
K K1 K.
verified that P (x - x ) = x - x . All the other steps of the
“ X  i 1 — X  ' 1 —X
algorithm remain unchanged. Thus, any feasible point generated by the 
algorithm also satisfies the linear equalities given by (7.7).
Let us now return to the Algorithm in Section 4 and attempt to 
identify the reason why the policy maker may wish to specify a given 




























































































is asked in Step 2 of the algorithm in Section 4 to specify 5 or the
preferred value x (= x + 6), he is, in effect, required to specifyp c —
the point, nearest to x^, which is in ft. This "nearness" is
measured with respect to the current weighting matrix Thus, he
is asked to specify x , which is the solution of-P
min{ h || x - x || * | < h, x > < g } (7.9)
" C  Sc "
*
where < h, x > < g  is one of the implicit constraints describing the 
region ft and violated at xc . The policy maker may not know that such a 
constraint exists until he notices that x is violating it (i.e. < h , x  »  g) .C — — c
Clearly, the policy maker also does not know h and g but can only
specify x . It is argued below that this is sufficient to identify
h to some degree, and thereby quantify ft, if x is interpretedP
as the solution of (7.9). This interpretation is shown to allow the 
use of Khatchian's algorithm, discussed above, to solve for a feasible 
point of ft n R in polynomial time by updating H = Q 1 and using
( 7 .5 ) - ( 7 .6 ) .
The solution of (7.9) can be obtained by writing the first order 
necessary conditions of optimality
< h, x > < g ,- -p X ( < h , x  > - g )“P
X > 0 .
0
(7.10)
Thus 6 = x^  - x^ = - 1 h X where the Lagrange multiplier





























































































X = - < h, x - x  > / < h, Q 1 h >-p -c c
X = - < x - x , Q ( x  - x ) > / < h, x - x > -p -c c -p -c - -p -c
Since X > 0, these yield
Thus, we have
< x  - x , Q (x - x ) > -p -c c -p -c --—.... ... . . . . . ....-
— 1 5̂< h, Q 1 h > c
2c Ü (7.11)
c
It may well be that more than one constraint is violated at x . Assume-c
that the system
H T x < g 
Tis violated at x^ (i.e. H x^ > g) for some appropriate dimensional 
matrix H and vector g. Then (7.9) can be rewritten as
min { h || x - HT x < g } (7.12)




























































































x - x = -Q 1 H X -p -c c
X > 0
(7.13)
for an appropriate dimensional Lagrange multiplier X. Thus,
6 = - Qc 1 H X and X is given by the solution of the quadratic progr­
amming problem (7.12). Khatchian's algorithm can utilize the constraints 
H x ^ g using X by defining h 4 H X, g = < g, X > . This is called a 
"surrogate" cut and is discussed in Goldfarb and Todd (1982) and Bland, 
Goldfarb and Todd (1981).
The above discussion illustrates the correspondence of the correction 
vector 6 used in the Algorithm in Section 4 and the constraint normals 
h used in Khatchian's algorithm. We now reformulate the the rank-one 




Q 5 6T qc —  *c
< 6, Q 6 > - c -
(7.14)
where y in (4.5) is given by y = 2/(n-l) and n £ 2. In this case, 
the results of Theorem 1 can be formulated such that (5.1) remains unchanged 
and a is given by
a  =
2 < 6, Q (x — x ) > - c -c - (7.15)
(n-1) < 6 , Q 6 > + 2 < Q 6, PH (Q 6) > - c -  c- c c -
The value y = 2/(n- 1) eliminates the need for specifying y explicitly. 
The vector of shadow prices (5.4) is replaced by
„2 , _




























































































Similar results can also be derived for (5.12) - (5.15) of Theorem 2.
The inverse of can be written using (7.14) to be
H = n
2 6 6T -t
H - ------  ----1-----
(n + 1) < 6, q 6 >- c - -1
(7.16)
Using the equivalence between 6 and h given by (7.11), we can express
(5.1) as






M < h, H h < h, (x - x^)> -c - - -c -







H h hT H c - - c
----------- ]< h, H h > c -
(7.19)
we note that expressions (7.6) and (7.8) of Khatchian's algorithm are
identical to (7.19) and (7.17) respectively, with P, = P, H, = H ,k k c
H, . = H , x, . = x , x, = x , and a set to k+1 n -k+1 -n -k -c
a = 1 / (n+1)
Also, in the case when 6 is given by (7.13), we have
P H H X cx = x - a -------------- —
”n ”C < H X , h H X > ^c






























































































1 P H H A___  k k -
n+1 < H X, H H A >%i
Thus, by exploring the similarities between Khatchian's algorithm in the 
presence of equality constraints and the algorithm in Section 4, we have 
ended up with an algorithm which has specific values for ]i and a that, 
by invoking Theorem 7, guarantee termination in a finite number of steps 
or iterations. Assuming that R n ^ 0, we summarise the algorithm:
Step 0 : Given x q and the equality constraints
and compute x = x - H N(NT H N)-1 -c -o o o
2lset H = 2  I, k o
(NT x - b) .-o
0
Step 1 : If x^e Q stop. Otherwise ask the policy maker to
specify 6.
Step 2 : Compute
1 P 6
x = x + -----  -----------n C - r» {■.n + 1 < 6 , 0  6 >- c -
and H using (5.16) . Set x = x , H = H and go to step 1 . n — c — n c n
In the above algorithm, x is not the solution to the optimization 
problem (3.1). However, x^ still exhibits the same property as in
(5.1) as x^ - x^ lies along the projection of the direction 6 speci­
fied by the policy maker. In addition, the above algorithm ensures 
finite termination in polynomial time by invoking Theorem 7.
The above algorithm and the associated concept of finite termination 
provides an insight to the policy decision process. Nevertheless, this 
finite termination property may easily be undermined by an indecisive 




























































































shrinking this region) as the algorithm proceeds. Another weakness of the 
algorithm arises when the assumption R n 0 breaks down. Although 
Khatchian's original algorithm can easily identify R n ft = 0 by not 
returning a feasible point after 4L(n + l)2 iteration, the value L is
difficult to estimate precisely in the above algorithm. However, it may
be possible to determine some upper limit to L, Fur t h e r m o r e ,
changes in the structure of ft seem to be in the nature of policy
design. This would, at worst, increase p in (7.2), and hence L.
It may also be nossible to determine an upper limit to p at the
beginning of the algorithm. Thus, the finiteness of the policy
design process with the above algorithm can be demonstrated. In
practice, experience dictates the choice of x 0 in Step 0. This
initial value is chosen to be in a close neighbourhood of the
region ft. Thus, the soeed at which x £ ft is attained with the— c






























































































It is clear from the discussions in Sections 3 and 4 that given only 
preferred directions for key target variables and an element of consis­
tency on the part of the policy maker (c.f. for example, Sen, 1970, p.63), 
it is possible to translate this 'qualitative' information into quanti­
tative modification of the weights. In this sense, Frisch's preoccupa­
tion with efficient formulation of interview techniques in terms of 
different types of questions for the formulation of alternative preference 
functions seems slightly misplaced.
The most interesting extensions and applications of the methods 
presented above would seem to be in the important area of shadow price 
determination. Since there is a clear dual relationship between the 
weights of a preference function and the constraints, and hence the 
conventional multipliers, it is evident that by reformulating the methods 
we have discussed above, a direct application to the desirable determina­
tion of shadow prices would be possible. In the conventional literature 
. on the determination of shadow prices, particularly with respect to the 
problem of economic development, there seems to be an imputation of an 
unwarranted halo of objectivity to such prices. The fact that they are, 
largely, as 'objective' as the weights of the preference function, is not 
always emphasized. Thus, as a 'truer' appreciation of the interlocking 
nature of weights, targets and instruments becomes evident due to the 
iterative nature of the method,an awareness of the objective constraints 
of the system also develops. Together with the weights, these latter 
are the principal determinants of shadow prices. It is, therefore, 
possible to apply a suitably formulated dual version of the above problem, 
and method, for the determination of shadow or accounting prices, and thus 




























































































values in the standard literature. Though this has been explicitly- 
recognized in the excellent UNIDO (1972) exposition, no formal solution 
was provided (c.f. in particular, chapter 18 therein). It is our 
conjecture that the method presented above provides a formal solution 
to the problem of 'acceptable' shadow price determination.
On the other hand, there may be a temptation to interpret the 
above method as a solution to the problem of the historical revelation 
of preferences (inverse optimal control). This is very clearly an 
incorrect interpretation, as can be shown as follows.
The idea of "uncovering the objective function 
once the decision has been made by others, is an old and illusive one.
It has arisen independently in control theory and in economics. The 
interest from the latter area is due to the desire to reveal the past
preferences of decision makers. The iterative method of Sections 3 and
4 may, in this case, be formulated s-o that the desired value 
d .x is set according £o the desirable historical
conditions, the feasible region R is set to the model of the economy 
and the preferred value is set to be the actual historical value. The 
preferred value is fixed at the historical value throughout the procedure 
and is not changed, as would normally be done in Step 2 of the original 
procedure in Section 4. In this setting, the historical value which, in 
this case, is also the preferred value, has to be a feasible point since, 
by definition, the model of the economy must explain the historical event 
Thus, for a linear model such as (3.4), the preferred value and all 




























































































NT 6 = 0 .
Using this and (3.9), we can express the stepsize a in (5.1) (or a z 
in (5.14)) as
U < <5, Q (x — x ) >- C -c -a  = ------------------------------------------------------------------
< 6, Q 6 > + y< Q 6, PH (Q 6 )>- c - c - c c -c
y < 6 , N X >_ ________ -___ —c_________________
< 6 , 0  6 > + y < Q  6, PH (Q 6 ) >- c - c - c c -c
= 0 .
Hence, if 6 £ R , then the stepsize a = a = 0 .  This is not a serious - o z
limitation of the method in general since, if x is feasible (x £ R),-P ~P
the decision maker can have exactly what he wants (i.e., since x £ A n R,“P
setting x^ = x^, the method stops). However, if the problem is to reveal 
the weighting matrix of a past decision, a = 0 shows that the method is not 
suitable for this purpose.
Finally, consider the obvious choice for x which is x = x .-P -P
However, this choice does not add any further information about the policy
maker's local preferences. It is already known from the outset that the
decision maker prefers xd to any x £ R. Hence xd is preferred to
x ( £ R ). The fact that x , x ^ x^ is preferred to x , constitutes-c ~P ~P ~ * -c
additional information about the local preferences of the policy maker.
The uselessness of setting x^ = xd is supported by the above method. To 




























































































x-n - a(i - H n (n t h n )-1
TN ) , < (x - Xc c -c
T , -i T H Q Cx- a(i - H N (N H N) N )c C C C — I
- a(i - H T -1 N (N H N) T N ) H NXc c c -c
= 0
which illustrates that this choice does not add any new information about 
the policy maker's preferences.
The main aim of the paper is to provide a method for the formaliza­
tion of political preferences by means, of the possible and necessary 
cooperation between policy makers and econometricians in the specific 
sense in which it was conceived by Frisch. We have, in this paper, 
attempted to provide a solution to a specific case dealt with in great 
detail by Frisch —  but by relaxing some of the restrictive conditions 
and by considering in depth the problem of convergence. The extent to 
which the determination of the weights of the special case has been 
’considered in relation to the almost arbitrary use to which such a form 
has been subject to in empirical and theoretical econometrics, may be an 
ex-post justification of Frisch's preoccupation with it —  and a 
rationale for our exercise.
Finally, the similarity between Khatchian's ellipsoid algorithm, 
computing a feasible point of a given linearly constrained region, and the 
method in Section 4 highlights not only the complexity aspects of the method 
but also suggests that the search for an appropriate weighting matrix by the 
method is similar to the search of Khatchian's algorithm for a feasible point 





























































































1 Also with a 'Nobel Prize' connotation, in that it was a lecture delivered 
at the invitation of the Federation of Swedish Industries, who initiated
a tradition to invite Nobel Prize winners (in economics) to give a lecture 
on an optional subject.
2 Frisch used, interchangeably, the words 'econometrician', 'model builder', 
'programming technician', 'scientist', etc. We will, therefore, retain 
the first of these terms to denote any one of these connotations.
3 i.e., the feasible set implied by, say, the behavioural and technical 
relations, constrained by the necessary accounting identities, character­
izing an economy.
4 Here, again, Frisch used, interchangeably, 'policy maker', 'politician', 
'economic planner', etc. We will keep to 'policy maker'.
5 "How to fix the bounds and how to determine the coefficients of the 
preference function are important practical problems. They are, indeed, 
so far-reaching that they lead us into a general consideration of the line 
of demarcation between the work of the politician and that of the scientist.
, Expressed briefly, and therefore necessarily without complete precision, we 
can say that the politician must introduce the human evaluations, the 
social value judgements, while the task of the scientist is objectively to 
find out what that factual situation is and what the inherent tendencies 
for change are, and what consequences COULD BE EXPECTED if one decided to 
put into effect such and such measures. In this work the scientist will 
simply have to take as data the goals themselves and the social value 
judgements at the back of them". (Frisch (1956), p.45).
6 In all cases, when we refer to 'optimal solutions' we refer, naturally, to 
the results obtained from a well-formulated constrained optimization ■ 
problem - or, as Frisch would say, a Macroeconomic Programming problem. 
However, preserving the spirit in which Frisch conceived the problem, we 
should qualify it by stating that our prime concern, as econometricians 





























































































7 "Many economists working on the theory and methods of economic planning
have been in tune with Ragnar Frisch in stressing the optimization 
approach. It appears somewhat surprising that so few have proceeded 
to taking up the question of how to establish a preference function. 
(Johansen (1974), p.51 : italics added.)
8 "The interview approach to the preference function is only a FIRST STAGE
in an iterative process which in each step proceeds bg an optimal 
solution of the model". (Frisch (1981), p.7 : italics added.)
9 The distinction between decision and target variables is analogous to 
the two sets of variables characterising the final form of an econometric 
model. However, the analogy is not complete in the sense that target 
variables are a subset of the two sets of variables characterising the 
final form.
10 It should be noted that any positive semi-definite quadratic function
arg min{ < a, x > + h < x, x > | x_£ R } = arg min{ (x)| x_ e R }
d dfor Q x = - a . Thus, provided this restriction on x is satisfied,c - - -
arguments concerning the constrained minimum of q^Cx) can also be 
extended to the more general quadratic function on the left of the above 
equality.
11 As the weighting matrix is symmetric, the quadratic functions (3.2) are
said to penalize a deviation of the optimal solution of (3.2) from the
desired value in a desirable direction as much as a deviation in an
undesirable direction. However, the definition of the desired values 
implies that each element of x is assigned the best possible value —  
implying Pareto optimality —  for that element. Hence, in this case, 
a deviation in a desirable direction of the actual solution from x° 
can only imply a mis-specification of xu
This orthogonal decomposition is given by N = [L ! 0] [ Q ] , where LI
is an m x m lower triangular matrix (for dim(b) = m) and Q an
T Torthogonal matrix (Q Q = Q Q = I). Furthermore, Q is partitioned 
such that its first m rows are set to the m * n submatrix and





























































































13 In the presence of equality constraints, these constraints are used 
to eliminate some of the variables from the problem hence resulting 
in a problem with reduced dimensions Csee Goldfarb and Todd, 1982). 
This, in turn, naturally reduces L in (7.2) and hence the bound on 
the number of iterations. This aspect is not considered further 
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